

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NSA-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-01

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USBERLIN 44

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, PFOR, MILI, GE, WB, US, UK, FR

SUBJECT: TRAVEL POLICY IN GDR AND IN BERLIN

REFS: (A) BONN 19641; (B) USBERLIN 2279

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: LATEST DRAFT TRIPARTITE TRAVEL
POLICY PAPER WOULD ALL BUT ELIMINATE TRAVEL BY CARE IN OR
THROUGH GDR BY ALLIED PERSONNEL STATIONED IN WEST
BERLIN AND WOULD MOREOVER NECESSITATE USE OF REGULAR
TOURIST PASSPORTS FOR SUCH TRAVEL AS MIGHT PROVE
POSSIBLE (A PRACTICE WE CONSIDER UNDESIRABLE ON
SECURITY GROUNDS). WE RECOMMEND FURTHER CONSIDERA-
TION OF REAL NEED, IN TERMS OF PROTECTING ACCESS
RIGHTS AND ALLIED POSITION ON STATUS OF BERLIN, FOR
SUCH PROPOSED PRINCIPLES AS NON-USE ON ACCESS ROUTES
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OF PASSPORT CONTAINING GDR VISAS, NON-ACCEPTANCE OF

GDR VISAS IN PASSPORTS CONTAINING COMMANDANT'S STAMP, AND PROHIBITION OF MIXED PROCESSING OF VEHICLES OR USAGE OF ANY PART OF ACCESS ROUTE FOR TRAVEL UNDER GDR CONTROLS. WE ARE ALSO INCLINED TO AGREE WITH BRITISH VIEW THAT PRESERVATION OF ACCESS ROUTES ARGUES IN FAVOR OF REQUIRING NOT JUST BERLIN-BASED ALLIED PERSONNEL BUT THOSE ASSIGNED TO FRG AS WELL TO USE ACCESS ROUTES FOR ALL SURFACE TRAVEL BETWEEN BERLIN AND FRG. OTHER MINOR MODIFICATIONS SUGGESTED BELOW INCLUDE EXPANSION OF GUIDELINES TO COVER TRAVEL BY ALLIED PERSONNEL PROCEEDING TO BERLIN FROM EASTERN EUROPE. END SUMMARY..

2. WE FULLY CONCUR IN AIRMS DESCRIBED PARA 2 OF TRAVEL POLICY PAPER (TPP) WHICH EMERGED FROM DEC 19 TRIPARTITE MEETING IN BONN (REF A) ALLIED LEGAL POSITION ON STATUS OF BERLIN AND ALLIED ACCESS RIGHTS TO BERLIN. THESE ARE CARDINAL PRINCIPLES WHICH MUST GOVERN ANY CHANGES IN TRAVEL POLICY, HOWEVER, WE HAD ALSO UNDERSTOOD OBJECT OF EXERCISE WAS TO EXPLOIT NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRAVEL IN GDR FOLLOWING ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, FOR TWO-FOLD PURPOSE OF PROVIDING AREA FAMILIARIZATION FOR ALLIED PERSONNEL AND OF FACILITATING MORALE AND RECREATIONAL TRAVEL. WE FEAR THAT, IN SEVERAL INSTANCES, NEW DRAFT HAS ENDORSED CURRENT PRACTICES WHICH TEND TO LIMIT TRAVEL OPPORTUNITIES WITHOUT QUESTIONING WHETHER THEY ARE IN FACT STILL ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVATION OF OUR POSITIONS ON STATUS AND ACCESS.

3. WE HAVE IN MIND IN PARTICULAR RULES PROPOSED IN PARAS 4A AND 4 B OF TPP, AS ELABORATED IN PARAS 6A AND 6B, THAT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO ALLIED MISSIONS AND GARRISONS IN WEST BERLIN SHOULD NOT USE ON ACCESS ROUTES PASSPORTS WHICH CONTAIN GDR VISAS AND SHOULD NOT ACCEPT A VISA IN A PASSPORT WHICH CONTAINS A COMMANDANT'S TAMP. AS PRACTICAL MATTER, FIRST OF THESE OBJECTIVES (NOT USING PASSPORT WITH GDR VISA ON ACCESS ROUTE) CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED FOR MOST TRAVELERS BY SWITCHING OVER TO USE OF MILITARY ID CARDS RATHER THAN PASSPORTS ON ACCESS ROUTES, AS CONFIDENTIAL

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RECOMMENDED IN REF B (PARA 13B); WE ARE IN FACT TAKING STEPS TO INSTITUTE THIS PRACTICE FROM BERLIN END. WE NONETHELESS QUESTION NEED FOR AN ABSOLUTE BAN IN TPP ON VISAED PASSPORTS ON ACCESS ROUTES. FACT THAT ALLIED PERSONNEL UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES SUBMIT TO GDR TRAVEL CONTROLS WILL BE WIDELY KNOWN AND WE BELIEVE IT UNLIKELY THAT SHOWING SOVIETS PASSPORTS INDICATING BEARERS HAVE PREVIOUSLY VISITED POTSDAM OR DRESDEN

WILL JEOPARDIZE ACCESS ROUTES, IE..., OF EAST GERMANS:
SOVIETS, CONTRARY TO QA AND QD, CHOOSE TO CHALLENGE LONG-
STANDING PRACTICES, THEY WILL ALWAYS BE ABLE TO FIND AN
EXCUSE.

4. WE ALSO QUESTION WHETHER IT IS STILL NECESSARY TO INSIST THAT
NO GDR VISA BE PLACED IN PASSPORT CONTAINING COMMANDANT'S
STAMP. AS BEST WE CAN RECONSTRUCT HISTORY OF THIS
LONGSTANDING PRINCIPLE, IT WOULD SEEM TO HAVE OUTLIVED
ITS USEFULNESS. OUR ADMITTEDLY SKETCHY HISTORICAL FILES
SUGGEST THAT CONVERSE OF RULE WAS ADOPTED MANY YEARS AGO
AS MEANS OF REINFORCING BAN ON ACCEPTANCE OF GDR VISAS:
IF NO-FEE PASSPORT SHOWED GDR MARKINGS, COMMANDANT'S OR
STATUS-OF-FORCES' STAMP COULD NOT BE ENTERED. WE QUESTION
NEED FOR PERPETUATING EITHER THIS ORIGINAL RULE OR ITS
CONVERSE UNDER TODAY'S CIRCUMSTANCES. PURPOSE OF
COMMANDANT'S STAMP IS TO IDENTIFY BEARER TO WEST BERLIN AND FRG
AUTHORITIES, SERVING IN EFFECT AS RESIDENCE PERMIT FOR
BERLIN AND, WHEN BEARER IS IN FRG, CERTIFYING THAT HE
POSSESSES PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES EQUIVALENT TO THOSE
AFFORDED UNDER SOFA TO MEMBERS OF FORCES STATIONED IN
FRG. STAMP IS NOT INTENDED TO DOCUMENT BEARER OF
PASSPORT TO SOVIETS OR EAST GERMANS AS INDIVIDUAL
TRAVELLING IN CONNECTION WITH OCCUPATION, AND WE SEE NO
RELEVANCE TO ACCESS QUESTION OF PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF
STAMP IN PASSPORT USED BY ALLIED PERSONNEL WITH
EITHER SOVIETS OR EAST GERMANS. (INCIDENTALLY, BMG
INFORMS US THIS IS A PECULIARLY US PROBLEM: AFTER
UK ENTRY INTO EC, BRITISH CEASED ENTERING EITHER
NATO SOFA STAMP IN PASSPORTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL
IN FRG OR COMMANDANT'S STAMP IN BRITISH FORCES'
PASSPORTS IN BERLIN.)

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5. WE URGE THAT DEPARTMENT WEIGH PROS AND CONS BEFORE
ACCEPTING RULES PROPOSED IN PARAS 4A AND 4B. THEIR
ADOPTION WOULD REQUIRE ALLIED PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO
WEST BERLIN TO PURCHASE SECOND PASSPORTS IF THEY ARE TO
TRAVEL AT ALL IN GDR. ASIDE FROM EXPENSE (IN US CASE FAMILY
OF FOUR WOULD HAVE TO SPEND \$52 FOR FULL-FEE PASSPORTS),
WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
ADVANCED IN REF B ARE VALID. (HERE AGAIN, BRITISH FACE
DIFFERENT SITUATION INASMUCH AS THEY HAVE NO DIPLOMATIC
PASSPORTS.)

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INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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6. BOTH WE AND BMG REGRET OUTCOME OF DISCUSSION OF MIXED PROCESSING OF BERLIN-HELMSTEDT AUTOBAHN. IT OF COURSE HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO TEST FEASIBILITY OF LEAVING WEST BERLIN AT HEERSTRASSE/STAAKEN AND HEADING SOUTH AND EAST BY ROADS OTHER THAN DESIGNATED TRANSIT ROUTES, ALL OF WHICH TOUCH THE BERLIN RING, BUT WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE SUCH TRAVEL WOULD BE PERMITTED BY EAST GERMANS. IF IT IS NOT, APPROVAL OF DRAFT TPP WITH LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 6B INTACT WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO SAYING THAT ALLIED PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO WEST BERLIN MAY NOT TRAVEL BY CAR IN OR THROUGH GDR, OR AT LEAST NOT TO ANY DESTINATIONS OF GENERAL INTEREST. WE THUS HOPE THAT POINT WILL BE REVIEWED IN DEPARTMENT, EVEN AT RISK OF FAILING TO ACHIEVE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE. WE WOULD NOTE THAT, WHILE SUCH UNITY IS DESIRABLE, IT HAS RARELY BEEN ACHIEVED IN PAST AND THAT ALLIED RIGHTS HAVE NOT

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DEMONSTRABLY SUFFERED. (IT MAY BE RECALLED THAT IN CASE OF TRAVEL BY CAR TO EAST BERLIN, IT WAS BRITISH WHO WERE OUT IN FRONT FROM OCT 1961 TO JUNE 1965 BY AGREEING TO DISPLAY DOCUMENTS AT CHECKPOINT CHARLIE, WHILE WE AND FRENCH REFUSED AND THEREBY DENIED ACCESS TO OUR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL. AFTER WE BEGAN SHOWING DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS THROUGH CAR WINDOWS IN 1965, AND NEWLY-DEvised US FORCES CARD IN 1966, OUR ACCESS TO EAST BERLIN BY CAR HAS GENERALLY BEEN UNIMPEDED. WE BELIEVE IT IS AT LEAST WORTH CONSIDERING THAT HIS TIME IT MAY BE WE, RATHER THAN BRITISH AND FRENCH, WHO ARE RIGHT IN BEING WILLING TO PERMIT MIXED PROCESSING ON AUTOBAHN ON TRIAL BASIS. WE DO NOT SUGGEST THAT THERE WILL NEVER BE ANY CONFUSION IN REGARD TO "MIXED PROCESSING" BUT WE BELIEVE ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE SHOULD BE MANAGEABLE. (AGAIN, WHEN AND IF SOVIETS GET READY TO WALK OFF THE AUTOBAHN, I IMAGINE IT WILL BE FOR BROADER REASONS.) WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT PROCEDURES PROPOSED IN REF B WOULD MINIMIZE CHANCES FOR GDR TO INSERT ITSELF IN ACCESS CONTROLS.

7. WITH REGARD TO "ALLIED PERSONNEL FROM OUTSIDE BERLIN" (PARA 7 OF TPP) WE OFFER TWO COMMENTS:

A. IN ITS PRESENT FORM, FIRST SENTENCE OF PARA 7A BY CROSS REFERENCE TO 6A PROCEDURES WOULD REQUIRE ALL TDY TRAVELERS TO WEST BERLIN TO ENTER VIA ACCESS ROUTES. THIS STRIKES US AS UNNECESSARILY CUMBERSOME FOR MAJORITY OF TRAVELERS FROM EASTERN EUROPE, SUCH AS PARTICIPANTS IN THE ECONOMIC-COMMERCIAL OFFICERS CONFERENCE TO BE HELD IN WEST BERLIN IN FEBRUARY. WE RECOMMEND REVISION OF FIRST SENTENCE ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

QUOTE IF PERSONNEL IN THIS CATEGORY ARE TRAVELLING TO WEST BERLIN ON OFFICIAL DUTY FROM THE US OR WESTERN EUROPE, THEY SHOULD ARRIVE AT AIRPORTS IN WEST BERLIN OR SHOULD BE SPONSORED AND PROCEED AS IN 6A ABOVE. IF TRAVELLING FROM EASTERN EUROPE, THEY MAY USE FLIGHTS TO SCHOENEFELD AIRPORT, OR, IF THEIR ROUTE DOES NOT TAKE THEM THROUGH THE FRG, MAY PROCEED

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BY RAIL OR CAR UNDER GDR DOCUMENTATION AND CONTROLS. UNQUOTE (EITHER HERE OR IN AMPLIFYING US NATIONAL REGULATIONS, POINTS FROM FINAL PARA OF STATE 272446 SHOULD BE REITERATED, TO ALERT RAIL TRAVELLERS OF NEED FOR DETRAINING IN EAST BERLIN AND OF MAKING ADVANCE ARRANGEMENTS WITH MISSION TO BE MET AT STATION.)

B. AS FOR PORTIONS OF 7A AND 7C BRACKETED BY US REP, WE ARE INCLINED TO AGREE WITH BRITISH POSITION (PARA 1 OF REF A) THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRESERVING ALLIED POSITIONS RESTS NOT JUST WITH PERSONNEL STATIONED IN WEST BERLIN BUT SHOULD APPLY WITH EQUAL FORCE TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL OF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS ASSIGNED TO FRG. (ARGUABLY, THIS MIGHT BE BROADENED TO INCLUDE ALL OFFICIALS TRAVELLING TO WEST BERLIN BY WAY OF FRG.) THUS, IF "SPONSORED/ IN PARA 7A MEANS PERSONNEL FROM FRG VISITING WEST BERLIN SHOULD TRAVEL ONLY VIA ACCESS ROUTES AND USE FLAT ORDERS, WE WOULD FAVOR DROPPING US BRACKETS. DESPITE FACT THAT LEAVE TRAVEL FOR USBER PERSONNEL WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY CHEAPER AND MORE CONVENIENT IF THEY COULD TRAVEL SOUTH TO HOF OR NORTH TO HAMBURG, USBER ACCEPTED EMB POSITION THAT USE OF OTHER ROUTES BETWEEN FRG AND BERLIN FOR TRAVEL BY OFFICIAL PERSONNEL COULD WEAKEN OUR CASE FOR INSISTENCE THAT SOVIETS MUST RETAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR HELMSTEDT ACCESS ROUTE. DANGER WOULD SEEM TO BE THE SAME WHETHER TRAVEL STARTS IN BERLIN OR FRG.

8. WITH APOLOGIES FOR INTRODUCING NEW ELEMENT AT THIS LATE DATE, WE RECOMMEND THAT TPP BE EXPANDED TO TREAT VISITS TO EAST BERLIN BY ALLIED PERSONNEL FROM OUTSIDE BERLIN.. SOME US OFFICIALS ON LEAVE HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO ARRIVE IN WEST BERLIN IN ANTICIPATION THAT VISITS TO EAST BERLIN ARE NOW SIMPLE; WHEN LEARNING THAT HOLDERS OF DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS MUST STILL ENTER ONLY VIA CHECKPOINT CHARLIE AND ONLY IN OFFICIAL OR US FORCES VEHICLES, A FEW HAVE EXPRESSED ANNOYANCE THAT MISSION IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE VEHICLES AND DRIVERS. PERHAPS BEST WAS TO TREAT POINT WOULD BE BY ADDITION OF SENTENCE TO PARA 7C OF TPP, POINTING OUT THAT
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TRAVELLERS MUST CHECK WITH RESPECTIVE WEST BERLIN MISSIONS BEFORE UNDERTAKING TRIP TO EAST BERLIN AND SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT SUCH TRIPS WILL IN ALL CASES BE POSSIBLE.

9. SHOULD ANOTHER TRIPARTITE SESSION BE REQUIRED IN BONN, MISSION WOULD WELCOME OPPORTUNITY OF SENDING AN REPRESENTATIVE(STATE 207613,(BONN 15064)

10 RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. DROP PARA 4(A)

B. DROP PARA 4(B) AND RELATED LANGUAGE IN SECOND

SENTENCE 6(B).

C. ADD AFTER A "AUTOBAHN" IN PARA 4(D) "FOR ACCESS."

D. IN PARA 6(A), THIRD SENTENCE, ADD AFTER "USED,"
"FOR ACCESS."

E. DELETE FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA 6(B).

F. MODIFY FIRST SENTENCE OF PARA 7(A) OF TPP ALONG
LINES SUGGESTED IN PARA 7(A) ABOVE.

G. DROP US BRACKETS FROM PARAS 7(A) AND 7(C) OF TPP; AND

H. EXPAND PARA 7(C) TO ALERT ALLIED PERSONNEL
VISITING WEST BERLIN ON LEAVE TO NEED FOR CONSULTING LOCAL
MISSIONS BEFORE PLANNING TRIPS TO EAST BERLIN.

I. CLARIFY EITHER IN TPP OR SEPARATELY GUIDELINES
ON USE OF SCHOENEFLIED AIRPORT (SEE PARA 11, REF B).
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Message Attributes

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